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Abstract
This paper is an empirical study of what motivates net contributors to support re-
distributive policies. While studies in the area have tended to consider broad measures of
inequality and support for redistribution in general, we focus on a single, salient relationship
between local unemployment rates and demand for spending on unemployment benefits.
Using a particularity of the Spanish labour market we estimate how workers’ stated prefer-
ences for unemployment benefits spending respond to changes in the local unemployment
rate. We then decompose this response into the part explained by risk aversion, and thus
demand for insurance, and the part explained by inequity aversion. Our results suggest
that increases in local unemployment rates lead to increased demand by workers for unem-
ployment benefits spending. Moreover, our results are consistent with an insurance motive
driving this relationship but provide little support for inequity aversion. Our results sug-
gest that studies of the relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution might
benefit from considering both the source and measure of the inequality and the instrument
of redistribution.
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1 Introduction
One of the main roles of modern governments is the redistribution of income. There is a
growing literature in Economics which seeks to understand just why it is that net contributors
to a redistributive system support it (Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001). Nearly every
OECD country has a degree of progressiveness in their income tax system (OECD, 2008, p.
112) designed to redistribute income from the better o  to the worse o  indicating a preference
among the population for redistribution. Some of the research in this area has shown that
the source of the inequality can play a role in determine the degree to which people support
redistribution. However, much of the literature on redistributive preferences has focused on a
general conception of these preferences and subsequent demand for redistribution. We consider
redistributive preferences within the context of a single redistributive instrument: unemployment
benefits.
In general, the specific policy instrument used to redress inequality has been ignored when
studying people’s preferences for redistribution. But the policy instrument is an essential part
of question of redistributive preferences. Piketty (1996) notes ‘individuals might well share the
same ‘values’ as far as distributive justice is concerned, but...they disagree about the way actual
inequality between individuals is generated.’ (p. 8). Where people disagree about the source of
inequality, they will likely also disagree about the policy best suited to redress the inequality.
It is therefore essential to consider redistributive preferences within the context of a particular
instrument since the underlying reasons for why a person supports redistribution might vary
from one instrument, say transfers to the poor, to another, say unemployment benefits.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between changes in the income distribution, as
measured by changes to the unemployment rate, and stated preferences for unemployment ben-
efits. Economists have identified a number of potential motivations underlying support for
redistribution like demand for insurance and inequity aversion and Alesina and Giuliano (2009)
note that the empirical disentanglement of these motives is di cult, albeit not ‘fatally’ so. We
address this challenge directly and seek to contribute to the empirical work on redistributive
preferences (e.g. Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Guillaud,
2013), using a newly constructed data set and a particularity of the Spanish labour market
whereby public sector workers enjoy nearly inviolable job security. We estimate the e ect of
individual unemployment risk and of the local unemployment rate on workers’ declared prefer-
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ences for redistribution via one instrument: unemployment benefits. We then decompose that
e ect into the part explained by risk aversion and demand for insurance and the part explained
by inequity aversion. Our results suggest that in this case it is demand for insurance that drives
declared preferences for redistribution. We find no evidence that inequity aversion plays a role
in determining people’s preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits.
Studying the unemployment rate/benefits relationship may provide deeper insight into pref-
erences for redistribution given the saliency of the two. Gimpelson and Treisman (2015) find
that there are systematic di erences between the perceived and actual level of income inequal-
ity when considering income shares. Kuzienko, Norton, Saez and Stantcheva (2013) argue that
demand for general redistribution might not be too intense because people are unlikely to be
aware of the level and changes in some more general inequality metric. Atkinson (2015) also
raises the issue of the saliency of changes in income distributions. He notes that a change in
the Gini of at least three percentage points may be necessary to be salient. Such a large change
generally takes years if not decades to be realized, perhaps reducing the salience of the over-
all change. Ashok, Kuziemo and Washington (2016) use broad questions about redistributive
preferences1 and inequality2 and find little evidence that rising inequality in the US has led to
increased demand for redistribution over the past 40 years. It is arguable that the absence of
any e ect in their study is due to the in-salient nature of changes to measures like the Gini or
percentile ratios. The level of unemployment, however, is a clearly visible, often reported and
simple to comprehend variable making it more likely that individuals will recognise any change
and respond, assuming that they respond at all. Moreover, in the case of unemployment, the
instrument (unemployment benefits) and the target of the redistribution (the unemployed) are
inextricably linked making it simpler to analyse the relationship between the two.
While focusing on unemployment goes some way towards addressing issues of salience, it
does so at the cost of generality. Our results tell us something about the relationship between
unemployment and demand for redistribution via unemployment benefits but may tell us little
about how demand for redistribution via some other instrument will respond to changes in the
income distribution. Nor are our findings on the underlying motives necessarily generalisable to
other forms of redistribution. The unemployment rate/benefits nexus is distinct from more gen-
1 Using, for example, the question from the US General Social Survey that asks respondents if they
agree with the statement that “The government should guarantee basic standard of living”.
2 They use changes in the income share of the top 1% of earners.
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eral conceptions of redistribution in some important ways. Unemployment benefits are designed
primarily to smooth consumption over time. Moreover, the insurance function of unemployment
benefits is likely to be more salient than its redistributive function. Unemployment benefits are
often referred to as unemployment insurance, though there is indeed a redistributive compo-
nent to unemployment benefits. As Boadway and Oswald (1983) argue, ‘casual observation
suggests that policy-makers have in mind redistribution of income as at least one rationale for
unemployment insurance’ (p. 195). Moreover, the unemployment rate and broader measures
of income inequality are linked (Bover, Bentolila and Arellano, 2002; Castells-Quintana and
Royuela, 2012).
This lack of generality may be a feature of our setting as well as a short-coming. Disagreement
over the manner in which income is redistributed is found in McCall and Kenworthy (2009) who
show that while people object to increasing inequality and support government intervention
to address the problem, they disagree about the appropriate instrument to do so. Thus, the
relative importance of di erent motives underlying redistributive preferences may depend on the
choice of redistributive instrument under consideration (Husted, 1990). General survey questions
about the role of government in the redistribution of income may neglect heterogeneity of the
preferences over the source of inequality and the instrument of redistribution and may therefore
fail to measure the relationship of interest. Again, we pay a cost of ‘generality’, but gain an
advantage insofar as our conclusions apply to a particular policy in a clear and direct way. In
summary, using unemployment and unemployment benefits to study redistributive preferences
allows us to focus on a single, salient measure of inequality and a specific, well-defined instrument
through which it is redressed.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2, we briefly review the literature and outline
a theoretical framework to aid us in interpreting our results. In Section 3, we describe our
data and discuss our identification strategy. Results are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 5.
2 Preferences for redistribution
Economists have identified di erent reasons why net contributors might support redistribu-
tive policies. First, demand for insurance may underlie preferences for redistribution. Net
contributors may support redistributive polices in case they themselves become net recipients
3
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at some point. This explanation fits comfortably with standard notions of economic self-interest
and redistribution as insurance has been studied extensively by economists (Casamatta, Cre-
mer and Pestieau 2000; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; De Donder and Hindricks, 2003; Zweifel,
2013). However, demand for insurance is insu cient to fully describe preferences for redistribu-
tion (Fong, 2001).
Economists have therefore considered alternative explanations for redistributive preferences
whereby net contributors derive utility from the welfare of others, directly or indirectly. Peo-
ple might derive utility from the welfare of others due to altruism (Rueda and Pontusson,
2010). Alternatively, people might display self-interest of the ‘enlightened’ variety, which would
also require an ‘other-regarding’ component to preferences.3 Such ‘other-regarding’ preferences
(Cooper and Kagel, 2013) would present themselves as a form of inequity aversion (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999), i.e. increased inequality would lead people to demand more redistribution. We
remain agnostic about why people might be concerned with the welfare of others and focus
instead on whether we see evidence of inequity aversion in preferences for redistribution via
unemployment benefits. We therefore consider a inequity aversion motive in addition to the
insurance (risk aversion) motive.4
Our primary interest is in empirically estimating the responsiveness of declared preferences
of workers for unemployment benefits spending to changes in the local unemployment rate. To
aid in the interpretation of our results we outline a simple theoretical model. We assume a
continuum of agents normalised to 1. Of these agents, share (1 ≠ u) will be employed and u
will be unemployed and eligible for unemployment benefits where 0 < u < 1. We are interested
in the preferences of the employed agents. All employed agents earn the same (gross) labour
income, y, and consume ce = (1≠ t)y, where t is a payroll tax used to fund the unemployment
3 For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) note that ‘the level of inequality may a ect crime and some
people may be more or less subject to the risk of criminal activities’ (p. 1). So net contributors may
be concerned with the level of inequality or the welfare of the poor but only insofar as it reduces the
the exposure of the contributor to crime.
4 Preferences may also have a fixed component. For example, individual beliefs have been shown to
be important. Such beliefs likely exhibit a degree of persistence. For example, religious beliefs are
found to be important (Neustadt, 2011) in the formation of redistributive preferences. An individual’s
beliefs about potential socio-economic mobility (Piketty, 1995) and/or the relative roles of ‘luck’ and
e ort in determining outcomes (Fong, 2001) have also been shown to be predictive of that individual’s
preferences for redistribution. While such beliefs can play a role in determining the level of demand
for redistribution via unemployment benefits, our interest is in the responsiveness of this demand to
changes in the level of unemployment, so any fixed component of preferences will drop out in the
derivative. We therefore exclude fixed beliefs from our analysis and focus instead on the roles of risk
and inequity aversion.
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benefit system and 0 < t < 1.5 Unemployed agents receive benefits, which allows them to
consume cu = —y, where — is the replacement rate, 0 Æ — < (1 ≠ t). That is, the e ect of the
choice variable, t, on the consumption of the unemployed is realised via —. Agent i derives utility
from her own of consumption and we allow her to possibly derive utility from the consumption
of unemployed people as well, where ◊i Ø 0 captures the degree to which i derives utility from
j’s consumption.
The timing of the model is as follows. We impose a veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971) on agents
such that, ex ante, they observe xi, a vector of i’s employment characteristics (e.g. education,
occupation, industry of employment and sector of employment), and know that share u of all
agents will be unemployed. The veil conceals the agents’ ex post employment status, although
each knows the probability that she will be unemployed, pi = pi(xi, u), where ˆpi/ˆu Ø 0 and
p¯ = u. Ex ante, agents declare their preferred level of redistribution via unemployment benefits,
túi , given xi, u and thus pi. While this set-up is highly artificial it provides an analogue to the
situation where workers have a preferred level of benefits spending in the face of uncertainty
about their continued employment and the prevailing level of unemployment.
The expected utility of agent i is:
E[Ui] © (1≠ pi)U(cie) + piU(ciu) + ◊iU˜(cju) (1)
where there first term is the utility i derives from her own consumption if she is employed, the
second term is the utility i derives from consumption if she is unemployed and the third term
is the utility i derives from the consumption of others when they are unemployed.
The budget constraint of the unemployment benefit system is:
ty(1≠ u) = —yu (2)
Rearranging yields
1≠ u
u
t = — (3)
5 Until 2009, unemployment benefits were essentially fully funded out of social security contributions,
but since then, due to the severity of the crisis and the high unemployment rate, those contributions
fund about 50% of the unemployment benefit system. To make up the di erence, the central govern-
ment transfers resources - funded out of general taxes. For simplicity, though, we use a single tax to
fund the unemployment benefits system in our model.
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where ˆcu/ˆt > 0 and ˆcu/ˆu < 0.6 That is, — varies with t and u to ensure the budget constraint
holds with equality.
Substituting equation 3 into equation 1 and maximising it with respect to t yield the FOC:
túi :
Marginal benefit
1≠u
u
#
piU Õu + ◊iU˜ Õu
$
=
Marginal cost
(1≠ pi)U Õe
(4)
where primes stand for partial derivatives of a single variable; and assume utility is an increasing,
concave function of consumption such that, U ÕÕ(.) < 0 < U Õ(.).7 We assume that the marginal
utility from i’s own consumption when unemployed, U Õu, is at least as large as the marginal
utility i derives from j’s consumption when j is unemployed, i.e. U Õu Ø U˜ Õu > 0.
We then totally di erentiate equation 4 with respect to u, and substitute the equation 4 into
it, yielding:
dtúi
du
= t
ú
i
u
I
(1≠ u)Áipi,u
#
U Õu + ◊iU˜ Õu
$
+ piU Õu [RAi ≠ 1] + ◊iU˜ Õu [IAi ≠ 1]
(1≠ u) #(piU ÕuRA+ ◊iU˜ ÕuIA$
J
Ø 0 (5)
where Áipi,u © ˆpiˆu upi Ø 0 is the sensitivity of i’s own probability of employment to changes
in u, RA © ≠U ÕÕuU Õu c
i
u Ø 0 is a measure of relative ‘risk aversion’ à la Arrow-Pratt (Arrow, 1965)
and, similarly, IA © ≠ U˜ ÕÕu
U˜ Õu
cju Ø 0 accounts for i’s ‘inequality aversion’ (Atkinson, 1970). Note
that the sign of equation 5 is unambiguously non-negative when IA > 1 and RA > 1 (Meyer
and Meyer, 2005).
The first two terms in the numerator
1
(1≠ u)Áipi,u
#
U Õu + ◊iU˜ Õu
$
+ piU Õu [RA≠ 1]
2
capture
the insurance motive. The more risk averse i is, the greater her demand for insurance. The
last term
!
◊iU˜ Õu [IA≠ 1]
"
describes the inequity aversion component which is a function of both
the degree to which i is concerned with the welfare of others (i.e. other-regarding), ◊i, and
how averse they are to inequality, IAi (i.e., the larger the increase in i’s marginal utility from
changes to cju, again due to the binding budget constraint of the system).
Our interest is not in the determinants of the level tú but in estimating an analogue of
6 Changes in — occur in practice as budget constraints becomes binding. For example, before July 2012
— = 0.7 in Spain. At that time the Spanish government enacted a law such that the replacement rate
remained at 70% only for the first six months of being unemployed, but from then on decreased from
60% till 50% (up to a maximum of 24 months). This constituted a change in — resulting from increased
u and falling tax revenue (t remained constant). See http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=23617.
7 Note that fixed beliefs about the level of tú could be introduced here in the form of a constant on the
left hand side, but, as noted above, we exclude fixed beliefs from the model for the sake of simplicity
as their inclusion here would not change the predictions of the model we are interested in.
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dtúi
du , the responsiveness of tú to changes in u, and to disentangle the risk and inequity aversion
components underlying the e ect. Empirically, such disentanglement requires one of the motives
to be held constant. The degree to which agents are other-regarding (◊i) is unobservable as is
IA. Our strategy therefore is to control for the risk of unemployment, pi, and thus the insurance
motive (risk aversion) by exploiting an institutional feature of the Spanish labour market.
In Spain most public sector workers hold civil servant status. These workers, known as
funcionarios, hold life-long appointments and are thus shielded from the vagaries of the labour
market.8 This institutionalized job security can be used to hold the insurance motive for re-
distribution via unemployment benefits constant, as these workers face almost no risk of unem-
ployment, i.e. p ¥ 0 and Áp,u ¥ 0. Given this feature of the Spanish labour market, we consider
two cases from the above framework:
Case I: Private sector worker (pi > 0, Áipi,u > 0, ◊i Ø 0)
These workers face a positive probability of becoming unemployed, pi > 0 and this probability
is a function of exogenous economic conditions, i.e. the unemployment rate, so Áipi,u > 0. As we
cannot observe ◊i, if we estimated dt
ú
du
---
private
> 0, we would not be able to conclude anything
about the underlying motives. As suggested above, to disentangle the motives we must hold
one of them constant. We do this by considering the case of public sector workers.
Case II: Public sector worker (pi ¥ 0, Áipi,u ¥ 0, ◊i Ø 0)
These workers have little reason to demand redistribution as insurance as they enjoy a very
high degree of, though not absolute, job security. Therefore, we would interpret a positive
estimate of dtúdu , as evidence of inequity aversion, i.e. ◊i > 0. Conversely, if dt
ú
du
---
public
= 0,
it would be consistent with the absence of inequity aversion, ◊i = 0, a conclusion that could
be generalised to all workers under the restriction that ◊|public Ø ◊|private. We discuss this
restriction in greater detail below.
3 Data and estimation
3.1 Data
We use survey and administrative data from Spain. Spain is an ideal setting for our study
as unemployment benefits are homogenous across the country, labour mobility is low (Bentolila
8 Although de jure funcionarios can be fired for insu cient performance (article 63, of the Law 7/2007,
April 12th, Basic Statute of the Public Worker), de facto this is extremely rare (Sanchez-Motos, 2007).
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and Jimeno, 1998) and unemployment benefits are tied directly to a particular tax in the form of
social security contributions. In Spain, Social Security contributions are collected from earned
income and this revenue must be used to fund unemployment benefits. This direct link arguably
makes the cost of increasing unemployment benefits more salient as it would require an increase
in Social Security contributions.
Information on individuals’ declared preferences for public spending, including on unem-
ployment benefits, as well as individual level socio-economic characteristics are taken from the
2005-2010 waves of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) survey. This annual sur-
vey in Spain is based on a nationally representative repeated cross section of 2,500 individuals
and focuses on subjective perceptions of the tax system and publicly provided goods and ser-
vices. Our interest is primarily in the stated preferences for spending on unemployment benefits
by employed respondents, 50.4% of the full sample. Respondents who are retired, studying,
unemployed or out of the labour force are excluded from the main analysis.
In addition to the socio-economic characteristics, we observe the municipality of residence for
each individual in the sample.9 We add information at the municipal level including unemploy-
ment rates, population, mean income for municipalities with at least 1,000 residents covering
98% of the population (detailed data are not available for the smaller municipalities). We also
add information on crimes at the provincial level as these are not available at the municipal
level. These data are collected from La Caixa and from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística
(INE) in Spain. Comparable data are not available for Navarra and Pais Vasco and so these
Autonomous Communities (ACs) are excluded from the analysis. We are left with a sample of
5,741 workers residing in 1,139 municipalities over five years.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for worker-level and municipal-level variables by sector
of employment. In Panel A we present the descriptive statistics for the workers and in Panel B
we present these for the municipal-level data. In column (1) we present the means and standard
deviations (in brackets) for private sector workers and in column (2) we present the same for
public sector workers. Though we are unable to identify those with funcionario status, and thus
virtually inviolable job security, most public sector workers are in fact funcionarios. During the
observed period, the share of public workers who are ‘civil servants’ (funcionarios, in Spanish)
9 Spain has three levels on sub-national administration. There are 17 Autonomous Communities (anal-
ogous to US sates) which nest 50 provinces (analogous to US counties) which nest 8,119 municipalities.
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was about 60 percent.10 However, it is important to note as well that even those that do not
have funcionario status (that is, their labor relationship with the public sector is through a
temporary or private contract) enjoy a higher degree of job security than workers in the private
sector (Sánchez-Motos, 2007). The final column shows the results of a t-test for the di erence
in the means with standard errors in brackets.
The first variable in Panel A of Table 1 (Prefers more UB) is our dependent variable. This
dummy is based on a survey question on respondents’ feeling about the current level of spending
on unemployment benefits. The question allows for five possible (mutually exclusive) responses:
‘too much’, ‘too little’, ‘just the right amount’, ‘unsure’ and refusal to answer.11 We have
excluded those who are unsure or refuse to answer (16 percent of respondents).
We define our dependent variable as equal to 1 if the respondent says ‘too little’ is spent on
unemployment benefits and 0 otherwise.12 We take it as given that this means that they would
prefer more money to be spent on unemployment benefits. We assume that respondents are
aware of the mechanism through which unemployment benefits are funded (note that respon-
dents are prompted at the time of the survey that greater expenditure is funded via taxation),
that is we assume that respondents know that there is no costless increase in public spending.
The second variable in Panel A, ‘unemployment risk’, is an estimate of each worker’s un-
employment risk based on their labour market characteristics. It is, in e ect, an estimate of
a worker’s idiosyncratic risk of unemployment, pi, defined in Section 2. We estimate pi using
the sample of employed individuals (those in Table 1) plus the sample of individuals who are
unemployed but previously had worked (i.e. those eligible for benefits or who left their job
willfully, but not retired people or those out of the labour force). The CIS records the sector,
occupation and industry for current jobs (if employed) and for previous jobs (if unemployed).
We then estimate
10 See the 2013 data released by the Boletín Estadística del Personal al servicio de las Administraciones
Públicas.
11 In Spanish, the survey question reads as follows: “Como Ud. sabe, el Estado destina el dinero que en
España pagamos en impuestos a financiar los servicios públicos y prestaciones de las que venimos
hablando. Dígame, por favor, si cree que el Estado dedica demasiados, los justos o muy pocos recursos
a cada uno de los servicios que le voy a mencionar”. In English: “As you know, the state spends
the money that we pay in taxes in Spain to finance public services and benefits about which we are
speaking. Tell me, please, if you think the state spends too much, the right amount or too little on
each of the services we will mention.” One of the several publicly provided goods and services that is
asked about is unemployment benefits.
12 We use a binary dependent variable defined in this way for expositional expediency. We also estimate
a multiple outcome model as a robustness check though.
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pi = wÕiÊ + ÷i (6)
where pi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if i is currently unemployed and 0 if i is employed, w
is a vector of i’s employment characteristics including occupation13, industry of employment14
and level of education all interacted with the sector of employment and year e ects, Ê is a vector
of parameters to be estimated and ÷i is a well-behaved error term. We estimate equation 6 via
a probit and the predicted probabilities, ‚pi, constitute the ‘unemployment risk’ variable.
As can be seen in Table 1 p¯|public = 0.06, about half figure for the private sector, meaning
our estimate of unemployment risk is positive for public sector workers despite their relatively
high degree of job security. With respect to Case II discussed at the end of Section 2, the
data suggest that pi is greater than 0, though closer to 0 than for those in the private sector.
However, the data support the restriction that ‘ip, u ¥ 0, as p¯|public is not sensitive to changes in
u. Note that p¯|public and p¯|private are not the probabilities of transitioning to unemployment
but are an unemployment rate. As such p¯ over-estimates the probability of transitioning to
unemployment in a given period since we only observe the stock of unemployed people, not the
flow (we do not know when they became unemployed). The important feature for our purposes
is that p¯|public does not vary over time and p¯|private does. If p¯ is increasing over time it
suggests that an increasing number of people are transitioning to unemployment. If it is stable
over time it suggest the probability of transitioning to unemployment has not changed. Figure
1 plots p¯|public and p¯|private as well as the national unemployment rate.
As the economy fell into recession and unemployment rose, p¯|private increased (positive
changes each year) meaning the probability of a private sector worker transitioning to unem-
ployment most likely increased as well. In the public sector p¯|public changes very little meaning
the risk of transitioning to unemployment remains stable over the period i.e. Ápi,u ¥ 0. O cial
employment statistics tell a similar story.15 Between 2008 and 2010, private sector employment
fell 11 percent, from 18.1 million to 16.1 million whereas public sector employment actually grew
13 Based on the 1979 National Classification of Occupations
14 Based on the two-digit National Classification of Economic Activities.
15 Employment numbers were obtained from the INE.
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slightly from 2.5 million to 2.6 million.16,17
As for the other individual-level characteristics (Panel A, Table 1), public sector workers are
three years older on average, less likely to be male and more likely to be a household’s primary
earner. Public sector workers tend to be more educated. Public sector workers are also more
likely to identify themselves as left-leaning politically.
In Panel B of Table 1 we consider the characteristics of the municipalities where the public
and private sector workers reside. The first variable in Panel B is the municipal unemployment
rate, our regressor of interest. On average, private sector workers live in municipalities with
slightly lower (half a percentage point) rates of unemployment. Otherwise public and private
sector workers do not live in systematically di erent municipalities, at least as measured by the
characteristics presented here. Note that no measure of individual or household income, shown
to be important determinant of redistributive preferences (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009), is
reported in the CIS, so we use mean municipal income, obtained from tax records, as a proxy
for household income (more on this below).
3.2 Estimation
Our analysis aims to determine the degree to which changes in the municipal unemployment
rate drive changes in stated preferences for spending on unemployment benefits, other things
being equal. To do so, we specify the following model of stated preferences for redistribution
via unemployment benefits:
dikt = x
Õ
ikt—1 + ﬁix
Õ
ikt—1ﬁ +m
Õ
kt—2 + ﬁim
Õ
kt—2ﬁ+
+—3ukt + —3ﬁﬁiukt + —4ﬁi + eikt
(7)
where dikt is a dummy for worker i in municipality k at time t which equals 1 if that worker
believes ‘too little’ is spent on unemployment benefits, ﬁi is a dummy equal to 1 if i is employed
16 We have also considered an alternative approach to identifying the funcionarios by assuming that
funcionarios are over 30 years of age, working in the public sector administration and working in
one of four occupations which we assumed to be most likely assigned funcionario status (no o cial
mapping exists). The mean ‘unemployment risk’ for this arbitrarily defined group is indeed lower
(0.04 versus 0.06 for all public sector workers taken together) and it also does not change over time.
17 Over this same period there was a corresponding increase in the number of unemployed people in
Spain increased from 2.6 million to 5.0 million. This strengthens our argument that pˆ, while not
measuring the actual probability of transitioning to unemployment, is in fact consistent with, if not
indicative of, the probability of transitioning from employment to unemployment. And that increase
in pˆ will thus be indicative of increases in the probability of transitioning to unemployment. Note
that it is also true that higher values of pˆ can result from increased unemployment duration. So, more
generally pˆ can be considered at the very least informative about individual exposure to the risk and
duration of potential unemployment.
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in the public sector, xikt is a vector of worker characteristics including age, gender, estimated
‘unemployment risk’ (pˆi), a dummy for the presence of children in the household, marital status
and a series of dummies controlling for home ownership distinguishing between a homeowner
with no mortgage, a homeowner with partially paid mortgage, a renter and a residual ‘other’
category to help control for workers’ mobility (discussed further below). —1 is the corresponding
vector of coe cients to be estimated, mkt is a vector of municipality k’s characteristics at time
t including log population, the log number of foreign residents, as there is evidence to suggest
that ethnic fractionalisation can a ect redistributive preferences (Dahlberg et al. 2012) and
the log mean income to help control for income as we do not observe individual level income
(discussed further below). We also include the log number of crimes, though at the provincial
level. —2 is the corresponding vector of coe cients to be estimated, ukt is the unemployment
rate in municipality k at time t, —3 is the impact of the local unemployment rate on stated
preferences for unemployment benefits where —3 is an analogue of ˆtú/ˆu and eikt is a composite
error term with a fixed component, –i, and a random component, ’ikt. Note that given this
fully interacted specification —Privatej = —j (j = 1, 2, 3) is interpreted as the e ect for private
sector workers and —Publicj = —j + —jﬁ as the e ect for public sector workers. A formal test of
whether the e ect di ers for the two groups is a simple t≠test of H0 : —jﬁ = 0.
The dependent variable is binary and thus we might estimate equation 7 using a non-linear
limited dependent variable estimator such as a probit. Such estimators, however, require addi-
tional assumptions for consistency (eg homoskedasticity, see Greene (2012), pp. 692-693) over
and above those of OLS. We therefore estimate equation 7 as a linear probability model (via
OLS) which can produce consistent estimates of the marginal e ects in which we are interested
(Angist and Pischke, 2009). We do check the robustness of our results to the use of a probit
below.
Regardless of the estimator used, estimation of equation 7 and the interpretation of the
results is complicated by four factors: the presence of fixed e ects, possible geographical sorting
by workers, potential omitted variable bias caused by unobserved income at the individual level
and possible sorting into sectors on unobservables. First, there may be systematic regional
di erences in redistributive preferences. For example, regional social norms have been found
to be important in the formation of redistributive preferences (Kuhn, 2011). If these norms
vary across regions, then we must control for them. To do so we include AC fixed e ects. We
12
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also include year fixed e ects to control common shocks a ecting the Spanish economy. This
aids the identification of the e ect of the unemployment rate rather than the e ect of general
macroeconomic changes that would correlate with the local unemployment rate.
A second issue is that workers may sort themselves geographically according to their level
of human capital. Those with larger endowments of human capital are more mobile than oth-
ers (Stambøl, 2003) and may migrate towards the areas with better job opportunities, i.e.
lower unemployment, such that the correlation between the level of human capital and local
unemployment rates could be negative. Such individuals, those with more education for ex-
ample, have generally been found to prefer less redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009) so
ˆredistribution
ˆHuman capital < 0. As a result, OLS estimates of —3 may be positively biased. However, while
such sorting may be a concern in theory, we note above that internal labour mobility in Spain is
in fact very low (Bentolila and Jimeno, 1998) so it is less likely to be a problem in our setting.
Even so, we include the homeownership status of individuals as a regressor the argument being
that homeowners are less mobile and thus are less likely to have migrated for work. We also
estimate the model using only workers who own their own homes as a robustness check.
Third, a further bias may result from the fact that we do not observe iÕs income. Income
is a key variable in determining demand for redistribution in Meltzer–Richard model (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981), though empirical results have been mixed. Some find little evidence of
income forming redistributive preferences (Fong, 2001; Corneo and Grüner, 2002) while others
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2009) find that it is important. By the Meltzer–Richard model, we expect
ˆredistribution
ˆincome < 0, i.e. higher income earners will tend to prefer less redistribution. We further
expect a negative correlation between individual income and local unemployment rate, as higher
rates of unemployment will exert downward pressure on wages (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).
Therefore OLS estimates of —3 may be positively biased. We attempt to mitigate this bias by
including the mean income in each municipality, though within municipality variation will clearly
still remain. We further control for a number of individual characteristics correlated with income
and potentially redistributive preferences (age, education, gender, occupation, and industry of
employment) though the omission of individual income will negatively bias the coe cient on
‘unemployment risk’.
Lastly, di erences between public and private sector workers could complicate the interpre-
tation of our results. We adopt an estimation strategy where employment in the public sector
13
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might be conceived of as the ‘treatment’ and our interest is in whether the treatment changes
how the unemployment rate a ects stated redistributive preferences. However, this ‘treatment’
is, of course, not randomly assigned. Selection into one sector or another will be the function
of any number of factors, many of which will be unobservable. Therefore, we cannot consider
the sector of employment as a random, or even as a conditionally random, ‘treatment’. This
selection into sectors will be problematic if workers sort into those sectors based on relevant un-
observable characteristics such as the degree to which they are ‘pro-social’ or ‘other regarding’
(◊). Such selection will limit any claims we might make about causality, but it may not render
the qualitative conclusions we draw from the sign and significance of results. As we are not able
to model selection into the sectors explicitly for lack of an identifying instrument, we must then
carefully consider the direction of the potential selection biases.
The existing evidence on the relative the magnitudes of ◊ for public and private sector
workers is mixed. Some studies have found public sector workers to be more pro-social/other-
regarding (larger ◊) than private sector workers (Houston, 2000; Banuri and Keefer, 2013) which
seems consistent with greater concern for redistribution, i.e. ◊Public > ◊Private. Tonin and
Vlassopoulos (2014), however, find no di erence in pro-sociality between sectors, i.e. ◊Public =
◊Private. We have no direct measure of ◊ in our data, though public sector workers are more
likely to self-identify as politically left-leaning, the end of the political spectrum traditionally
associated with greater support for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). We are not
aware of any study providing evidence consistent with ◊Public < ◊Private.
Given the existing evidence, we assume ◊Public Ø ◊Private so that selection into the public
sector produces a positive bias in estimates of —public3 and selection into the private sector
produces a negative bias in estimates of —private3 . Thus our estimates of —
public
3 can be seen as
an upper bound and of —private3 as a lower bound.
4 Results
We present our main results in Table 2, estimating the model using employed individuals.
All estimates presented in Table 2 are obtained via OLS and standard errors are clustered at
the municipal level. In column (1) we present the results obtained from estimating the model
for all workers while interacting all the regressors with a dummy equal to 1 if i is employed in
the public sector in period t (see equation 7). We return to columns (2) and (3) in Section 4.1
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below.
The marginal e ect (calculated at the mean characteristics) of being in the public sector is
-0.05 (p-value=0.013), indicating that public sector workers are, on average and ceteris paribus,
about 6 percentage points less likely to support increase unemployment benefits spending than
their private sector counter parts.18
The coe cient on ‘unemployment risk’ (— = 0.75, p≠ value < 0.000) indicates that private
sector workers facing greater ‘unemployment risk’ are more likely to support increased spending
on unemployment benefits. The coe cient on the interaction term of public sector worker
and ‘unemployment risk’ is negative (— = ≠0.60) and statistically significant, though only at
the 10 percent level (p ≠ value = 0.073), indicating that the e ect of risk di ers for public
and private sector workers. The e ect of this risk for public sector workers is close to zero
(— = 0.75 + (≠0.60) = 0.15) and not statistically significant (p≠ value = 0.622).19
Similar variation over public and private sector workers is present in the e ect of the local un-
employment rate. The e ect is positive (— = 1.28) and statistically significant (p≠ value = 0.002)
for private sector workers. This suggests that increases in the unemployment rate lead to in-
creases in a private sector worker’s support for more spending on unemployment benefits. The
interaction of the unemployment rate and the public sector is also significantly di erent from
0 (p-value=0.034) indicating that there is a significant di erence in the e ect between private
and public sector workers. For public sector workers, the e ect (— = 1.28 + (≠1.63) = ≠0.35) is
not statistically di erent from 0 (p≠ value = 0.621). These results suggest that while increases
in the local unemployment rate lead those working in the private sector to prefer increased
spending on unemployment benefits, the stated preferences of those enjoying the relative job
security of the public sector do not change.
We summarise our main results graphically in Figure 2 which shows the marginal e ects
18 Note that this marginal e ect is complicated by the fact that the sector of employment also appears
in in the estimation of pˆ in equation (6). The overall marginal e ect of a being in the public sector
is equal to ˆdˆpˆ
ˆpˆ
ˆﬁ +
ˆd
ˆﬁ . Combining these yields an overall e ect of being in the public sector -0.06.
However, we are unable to compute standard errors for this e ect as ˆpˆˆr and
ˆd
ˆpˆ ,
ˆd
ˆr come from
di erent models using di erent regressors and di erent samples (employed and unemployed versus
only the employed, respectively). As such we cannot obtain estimates of the standard error of the
linear combination of the e ects. Given this lack of standard error and as the full and partial e ects
are very similar, we report the partial e ect in the tables of results.
19 Results are una ected by using the alternatively identified funcionarios (see fn 16) instead of all
public sector workers.
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outlined above. The dark bars are the marginal e ects for those working in the private sector,
both of which are statistically di erent from 0 at the 5 percent level. The light bars are the
marginal e ects for those in the public sector, neither of which are statistically di erent from
0. Our main result suggests that changes in the local unemployment rate do a ect the stated
preferences for spending on unemployment benefits, but only for private sector workers, i.e. those
workers with an insurance motive. In the absence of this motive, i.e. for public sector workers,
changes in the local unemployment rate do not a ect stated preference for redistribution via
unemployment benefits.
We test the robustness of these results in a number of ways and present the results from
these checks in Table 3. In column (1) we re-estimate the fully interactive model but include
provincial rather than AC fixed e ects.20 The e ect of the unemployment rate and the di erence
in the e ect for public and private sector workers maintains. The e ect of unemployment rates
on the stated preferences of public sector workers is not statistically di erent from zero.
Given the importance of the ‘unemployment risk’ variable in our model, we consider the
robustness of the result to an alternatively obtained pˆi. We re-estimate equation 6 using a fuller
set of regressors including gender, age and province of residence in addition to the labour market
characteristics used in the initial estimation of ‘unemployment risk’. We use this new estimate
of pˆi and re-estimate our baseline model (results in column (2)). This alternative approach to
estimating the ‘unemployment risk’ produces qualitatively similar results to those in column (1)
of Table 2.
In column (3) we estimate the model using homeowners only as this is the sub-population
least likely to relocate and thus bias our results as discussed in Section 3.2. Again the results are
stable. In column (4) we present the marginal e ects from a probit estimator. The magnitude
and significance of the e ects are very close to those in Table 2. Results from a logit (not
presented) were very similar to those in column (4).
In our primary analysis we use a binary dependent variable equal to one if the respondent
believes ‘too little’ is spent on unemployment benefits. This is based on a survey question
with multiple responses however. We therefore use a multinomial logit and allow for three
responses: ‘too little’, ‘just right’ and ‘too much’. In columns (5) and (6) we present the
20 While there are more provinces, and thus the fixed e ects will capture more of the variation in
unemployment rates, provinces are purely geographical units and do not have any administrative
role.
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marginal e ects obtained from the multinomial logit where the reference group is that spending
on unemployment benefits is ‘just right’. The coe cients in column (5) are the e ect of each
variable on the probability of reporting ‘just right’ relative to reporting ‘too much’. Here the
coe cient on the local unemployment rate is negative as higher rates of unemployment reduce
the probability a respondent believes ‘too much’ is spent on unemployment benefits relative to
reporting that unemployment benefits spending is ‘just right’. The e ect for public sector workers
(— = ≠0.50 + (0.76) = 0.26) is not statistically di erent from zero (p≠value = 0.512). In column
(7) the coe cients are the e ect on the probability of believing ‘too little’ is spent relative to
the unemployment benefits spending being ‘just right’. The results are again consistent with
the unemployment rate increase demand for unemployment benefits spending by private sector
workers and not a ecting the stated preferences of public sector workers.
We also carry out ‘placebo tests’ as it may be the case that private sector workers generally
favour increased public spending in an e ort to stimulate economic growth and thus improve
their job prospects and reduce the risk that they become unemployed. In this case the change
in declared preferences for increased spending on unemployment benefits would not necessarily
reflect an increase in the demand for insurance, but rather than increased demand for public
spending in general. The CIS survey asks respondents for their view not only on unemployment
benefits spending but also on a number of other public goods. We model preferences for spending
on each of these. We generate a series of dummies which take a value of one if the respondent
thinks ‘too little’ is spent on four other publicly provided goods/services: health, education, the
justice system, policing and infrastructure. We then replace our primary dependent variable
with these dummies and re-estimate the model, excluding in each case respondents who refuse
to answer as we do in the primary analysis. Results are presented in Table 4.
The impact of the unemployment rate and of ‘unemployment risk’ on stated preferences for
the public provision of these other goods/services is insignificant at the 5 percent level in every
case. The coe cients on the interaction terms for public sector workers and unemployment risk
is significant at the 10 percent level for health care spending (column 1) as is the coe cient
on the interaction term for public sector workers and the unemployment rate for Education
spending (column 2). However, in neither case is the total e ect for public sector workers found
to be statistically di erent from 0. These results suggest that we are measuring a particular
relationship between the unemployment rate and stated preferences for unemployment benefits
17
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and not a more general relationship between the state of the economy and preferences for public
expenditure.
We next extend the analysis allowing the e ect of changes in the local unemployment rate
varies not just between the public and private sector workers but more generally with the degree
of ‘unemployment’ risk.
Our primary analysis exploits a peculiarity of the Spanish labour market whereby many
public sector workers enjoy virtually inviolable job security. But some private sector workers
may also enjoy a high degree of job security. The argument put forth in the Section 2 can be
applied to private sector workers with a high degree of job security. That is, we can relax the
dichotomy assumed until now (that public sector workers have job security and private sector
workers do not) and allow the job security to vary over individuals. To do so we allow the
e ect of the local unemployment rate to vary with the individual ‘unemployment risk’ faced by
an individual. We expect the stated preferences for unemployment spending of those workers
facing higher levels of ‘unemployment risk’ will be more responsive to changes in the local
unemployment rate.
To test this we include a further regressor which is the interaction of the municipal unem-
ployment rate and pˆi from equation 6 and, additionally, the sector of employment. Results are
presented in the last columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. In column (2) we include an additional in-
teraction between the ‘unemployment risk’ variable and the municipal unemployment rate. The
coe cient on this new interaction term is positive and statistically significant (p≠value = 0.030)
suggesting that the impact of the unemployment rate on demand for unemployment benefits
spending is larger for those workers at greater risk of losing their jobs.
This model, however, may be overly restrictive in that it forces the interaction of ‘unem-
ployment risk’ and the local unemployment rate to be the same for public and private sector
workers. To relax this we introduce a further interaction between the local unemployment rate,
‘unemployment risk’ and the dummy for public sector workers in column (3). The coe cients
on the interaction terms are both statistically significant at the 10 percent level. At the mean
‘unemployment risk’ for private sector workers (p¯ = 0.123), the e ect of local unemployment
for private sector workers is statistically significant 0.97 (p≠ value = 0.006) and is increasing in
‘unemployment risk’. For public sector workers, however, the e ect of the local unemployment
rate (calculated at the mean of ‘unemployment risk’ for public sector workers, r¯ = 0.061) is 0.11
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and is not statistically di erent from zero (p≠ value = 0.808).
The stated redistributive preferences of those private sector workers in industries and occu-
pations with less job security are more sensitive to changes in the local unemployment rate than
those with more secure jobs. Such variation is not present for public sector workers since, even
those workers in relatively less secure industries and occupations, enjoy the relative security of
being in the public sector. This result reinforces the implications of the primary analysis and is
consistent with the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2.
5 Conclusion
The redistribution of wealth is one of the primary activities of the public sector, controversial
though it may be. The reasons why people demand such redistribution even when they are net
payers into the system are not fully understood. Studying redistributive preferences with respect
to particular instrument (unemployment benefits in this case) rather than in general might lead
to more refined understanding of how those preferences are formed and expressed. In this
paper we have set out to test the motivations underlying individuals’ stated preferences for
one form of redistribution, unemployment benefits, and explore the extent to which support for
redistribution is due to inequity aversion or risk aversion (demand for insurance). To do so we
use data on workers in Spain, a country with an institution of near inviolable job security for
public sector workers.
We have shown that changes in the local rate of unemployment have a significant and eco-
nomically relevant e ect on workers’ stated preferences for spending on unemployment benefits.
We attempt to empirically disentangle the roles of demand for insurance and inequity aversion in
forming preferences for redistribution. We find support for an insurance motive but no evidence
of inequity aversion. From an economic point of view, it is important to know whether individ-
ual preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits incorporate inequity aversion as
well as risk aversion as failure to account for such motives may lead to an ‘under-provision’ of
redistribution. The absence of evidence for inequity aversion has implications for the concep-
tion of redistribution, via this particular instrument, as a public good (Pauly, 1973; Dorsch and
Graham, 2009). Therefore the identification of the motive underlying redistributive preferences
is more than an academic exercise but can have policy implications as well.
It is important to note that while the results are consistent with the dominance of the insur-
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ance motive in determining preferences for redistribution via unemployment benefits, we cannot
readily generalise to all redistributive instruments. It may be true that individuals view unem-
ployment benefits as a type of insurance while the purely redistributive role of those benefits
goes under-appreciated by workers. Our results do not mean that all forms of redistribution
are viewed as equal and that inequity aversion does not drive demand for other forms of redis-
tribution (e.g. food stamps, progressive income tax, social housing). The evidence presented
here suggests the absence of inequity aversion underlying demand for redistribution via unem-
ployment benefits. However, others have found evidence of inequity aversion, in some form,
underlying demand for redistribution in general (e.g. Corneo and Grüner, 2002). We hope our
result motivates future work focusing on the formation of redistributive preferences with re-
spect to particular redistributive instruments rather than preferences for redistribution in some
general sense to gain deeper insight into the complex nature of redistributive preferences.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Spanish data from 2005-2010
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Sector
Private Public Di erence
Prefers more UBd 0.426 0.350 0.077***
(0.495) (0.477) (0.017)
Unemployment risk (‚pi) 0.123 0.061 0.062***
(0.084) (0.072) (0.003)
High school onlyd 0.357 0.287 0.069***
(0.479) (0.453) (0.016)
Post-High schoold 0.210 0.537 -0.327***
(0.408) (0.499) (0.014)
Marriedd 0.548 0.582 -0.034*
(0.498) (0.493) (0.017)
Young childd 0.446 0.477 -0.031
(0.497) (0.500) (0.017)
Age 38.318 41.162 -2.844***
(11.419) (10.775) (0.384)
Maled 0.598 0.514 0.084***
(0.490) (0.500) (0.017)
Primary earnerd 0.671 0.740 -0.069***
(0.470) (0.439) (0.016)
Homeownerd 0.136 0.150 -0.014
(0.342) (0.357) (0.012)
Panel B: Municipal characteristics
Municipal unemployment 0.084 0.090 -0.006***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.001)
Municipal population 475.341 475.583 -0.242
(924.523) (913.781) (31.367)
Foreign residents 783.454 792.640 -9.186
(621.540) (558.409) (20.753)
Provincial crimes (‘000) 87.597 87.250 0.347
(113.156) (112.746) (3.845)
Mean municipal income (Ä‘000) 17.367 17.293 0.074
(5.847) (5.910) (0.199)
Workers 5,741 1,139
Notes: The superscript (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy. The bracketed values are standard deviations in
the first two columns and the standard error of the di erence between the means in the third column. Stars indicate
statistical significant di erence between the mean value for the private sector and for the public sector according to the
following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Figure 1: National unemployment rate and unemployment risk (‚p) by sector over time
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Notes: The o cial unemployment rate is obtained from the INE. The plots for the unemployment risk of the public and
private sectors are based on predicted probabilities of transitioning to unemployment (pˆ) obtianed using the CIS data.
Table 2: Main results
(1) (2) (3)
Interacted with risk
Unemployment risk 0.747*** 0.044 -0.017
-0.182 (0.372) (0.370)
Public◊Risk -0.601* -0.675** -0.286
-0.335 (0.326) (0.364)
Unemployment rate 1.279*** 0.060 0.045
-0.405 (0.581) (0.579)
Public◊Unemployment -1.625**
-0.765
Risk◊Unemployment 6.852** 7.479**
(3.154) (3.141)
Risk◊Public◊Unemployment -6.359*
(3.575)
Public (at mean characteristics) -0.054** -0.055** -0.056**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Workers 5,741 5,741 5,741
R2 0.045 0.042 0.043
Notes: The dependent variable in the main equation is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes ‘too little’ is spent
on unemployent benefits and 0 otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the provincial
level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Individual
controls, municipal level controls and both year and AC fixed e ects are included in all models.
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Figure 2: The marginal e ects of ‘unemployment risk’ and the unemployment rate for private
and public sector workers
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Notes: The left most bar is the estimated marginal e ect of a change in the unemployment rate on support for increased
unemployment benefits by private sector workers. The dark bars di er from 0 at the 5 percent level, light colored bars
do not di er from 0 at even the 10 percent level.
Table 3: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mulitnomial logit MFX
Province Alternative Homeowner Probit ‘Too much’ ‘Just right’
FE risk only to ‘Just right’ to ‘too little’
Unemployment risk 0.769*** 0.574*** 0.740*** 0.757*** -0.266** 1.243***
(0.180) (0.129) (0.240) (0.184) (0.105) (0.341)
Public◊Risk -0.663** -0.697** -0.833** -0.581* 0.163 -0.990
(0.321) (0.331) (0.384) (0.351) (0.181) (0.651)
Unemployment rate 1.067** 1.212*** 1.212** 1.312*** -0.497** 2.126***
(0.443) (0.415) (0.518) (0.413) (0.198) (0.648)
Public◊Unemployment -2.164*** -1.560** -2.118** -1.676** 0.755* -2.599*
(0.811) (0.761) (0.902) (0.826) (0.388) (1.566)
Public (at X) -0.055*** -0.072*** -.065** -0.051** -0.053** 0.025*
(0.020) (0.016) (0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014)
Workers 5,741 5,741 3,665 5,737 5,741
R2 0.060 0.045 0.051
Pseudo≠R2 0.034 0.049
AC FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial FE Yes No No No No
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes ‘too little’ is spent on each publicly
provided good/service, in turn, and 0 otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the
provincial level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Individual controls, municipal level controls and year fixed e ects are included in all models.
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Table 4: Placebo tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Health Education Justice Security Infrastructure
Unemployment risk -0.126 -0.326 -0.199 -0.092 -0.034
(0.223) (0.234) (0.215) (0.198) (0.129)
Public◊Risk -0.650* -0.171 0.015 -0.025 -0.260
(0.389) (0.453) (0.411) (0.389) (0.234)
Unemployment rate -0.259 0.191 -0.418 -0.432 0.432
(0.473) (0.468) (0.482) (0.445) (0.264)
Public◊Unemployment 0.581 -1.578* -0.655 -0.356 -0.247
(0.821) (0.855) (0.887) (0.841) (0.555)
Public (at X) -0.015 0.048** 0.012 0.018 -0.006
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.015)
Workers 5,687 5,520 5,286 5,609 5,697
R2 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.051 0.040
Note: The number of observations varies as we condition inclusion in these models on being included in the sample used
in our primary estimation in Table 2 to ensure we are starting with the same base sample and then exclude those who
are unsure or refuse to answer in each case. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes
‘too little’ is spent on each publicly provided good/service, in turn, and 0 otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors (in
brackets) are clustered at the provincial level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule:
*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Individual controls, municipal level controls and both year and AC fixed e ects are included
in all models.
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